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ABSTRACT
In the modern analytic war game, a military situation is simulated
by describing the conflict in a mathematical model and carrying out the
"play" of the game by computer. The traditional methods of tactical
analysis are blended with the relatively new methods of mathematical
simulation.
This thesis has been written with the purpose of familiarizing the
military officer with this new and promising analytic tool.
Internal features of the game, which should be understood and
appreciated by the military beneficiary of war game results, are
examined. These include mathematical approximations, assunptions, and
simulated decisions using the Monte Carlo technique. Some guidelines
are suggested to assist the user in determining the meaning and rele-
vancy of war game results. The objectives, appropriate uses, advan-
tages, and disadvantages of this analytic technique are discussed





The analytic war game, usually played on a high speed digital
computer, is becoming an accepted, though controversial, aid to the
military decisionmaker,. The purpose of this thesis is to attempt
to collect and condense information about, and assess the usefulness
of, this relatively new approach to military analysis.
It is intended that the treatment of the subject will take the
point of view of looking at the value of this technique to the mil=
itary planner who must make use of all available methods of analysis $
even though he may not have had an opportunity to explore each method
in depth.
The ideas and opinions distilled in this report have been drawn
from current literature in the field, from formal courses in war gain-
ing, and most profitably from conversations with military officers
deeply concerned with uses and misuses of analytic methods, and civil-
ian operations researchers who are involved in the solution of mili-
tary problems.
The author is indebted to Professor Alvin F, Andrus for his
expert guidance during the preparation of the thesis and to Professor
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The purpose of this thesis is to present to the military officer
a critique of analytic war gaining in light of its contribution to the
knowledge of modern military strategy and tactics. While this subject
has been explored extensively, there does not seem to be much formal
dialogue directed to the military decisionmaker, who must make opera-
tional decisions based on results of mathematical analysis, The under-
standing and appreciation of each analytic method is essential to the
making of better military plans in a volatile world situation . This
paper is an attempt to partially fill this gap as regards the partic-
ular methodology of war game analysis
.
2 * Concepts and terms
In any mathematical analysis, it is assumed, or at least believed,
that the relations involved in the real system can somehow be quantified
and abstracted. This abstraction is called a model, whether it be a
simple addition equation or a series of complex formulae attempting to
describe interactions between nucleons, The model has been described




In military war gaming, this symbolic representation,
or model, is a mathematical image of the military setup tiiat we are
trying to learn more about, We can vary the quantities in the model
and develop a series of configurations which might suggest a picture
of the model in natural motion. By doing so, we simulate or capture
the appearance of the real system being investigated, '..'hen the con-

flict or engagement is "played out" v/e say that the action is being
simulated
.
There are many types of simulation: wind tunnels, link trainers,
physical models, etc., but the term as used here will imply a computer
play of a military conflict situation.
A simulation mu3t also be distinguished from a computer solution
to a definite, but lengthy, numerical problem. Many solutions to
linear programming problems, for example, are cariied out entirely
by computer. A simulation, on the other hand, implies some complex
entity which is in motion and the results of such motion are not
uniquely determined, as they would be in a solution to a static mathe-
matical problem. The link trainer, for example, is meant to simulate
a real aircraft, but each time it is used the results are different
and may or may not compare well with the results of an actual flight
by the same pilot*
War games . When the concept of an opposing force capable of
making decisions is introduced, the simulation becomes a game. During
the play of the game, decisions made by the enemy may be predetermined
or chosen randomly, but they will still be considered essentially as
actions by a rational enemy.
Unless modified, e,g., manual war game, the phrase war game will
be used synonymously with the term simulation in this thesis.
3. Types of war games .
The war game has a long history as an aid in planning military
operations and as a method of gaining insight into possible future
military engagements (32). War gaming, in general, can be divided
according to the Wo purposes for which it is employed. Although

these purposes will overlap in any given game, one will usually be
given as the primary reason for formulating the game originally.
One purpose has been for the training of the decisionmaker. This
type of game could be played through, allowing a prospective leader to
make all the decisions necessary to the success of the campaign, there-
by gaining experience that he might never get until such time when
errors in judgment would be far more costly. In recent times, this
use of the game as a training device has become an elaborate and soph-
isticated method of training executives in industry as well as future
admirals and generals. Many computer assisted business games have
proved beneficial to men who already hold positions as responsible
decisionmakers (2), In the IJavy, the Naval Electronic Warfare Simu-
lator (NEWS) at the I'Javal War College is contributing to the decision-
making ability of many Naval Officers (15). These games create an
artificial atmosphere in which decisions can be made which closely
resemble, in form, the actual decisions which must be made in the real
world, War games used in this regard are primarily training devices,
or act as a means of examining human factors involved in a conflict
situation.
The other purpose of '.Tar games, and the one that this paper will
be concerned with, is the use of war games as an analytic tool, the
results of which may be used to guide military plarjiers. To qualify
as a method of analysis, the gaming method must go beyond the educa-
tion and enlightenment of those directly connected with the game model
and it must produce results upon which future action can be based.
Gome analysis has been done in the past using war games, but the action
taken has been limited to tactical changes where the game itself has

served as a focusing device to point out faults to be corrected in the
field. The game results have seldom dictated major strategic u] als,
Today the war game is being called upon to perform a greater and more
crucial service. From this type of analysis many decisions must be
made, not solely restricted to tactics, but involving weapons systems
procurement, the future of deterrent systems, employment of military
resources on a world scale, and a host of problems whose solution may
never be tested in the cold light of reality Often no experience is
available to corroborate analytic results obtained on these subjects.
Analytic war games can be devised in a great variety of forms.
The simplest being the mere thinking out of a conflict situation by
assigning moves to the enemy and determining counter moves,
primitive mental game has been formalized into games like chess At
the other extreme, large manual war games are conducted periodically
in the form of fleet exercises with "friendly", but unpredictable
.
enemies. Although the primary purpose of these workouts is training,
post-exercise analysis is getting increased attention
While it is not imperative in this paper to distinguish between
a machine-played game and a similiary game played by hand, the comput-
erized game will be dealt with since it is becoming the foremost method
of "playing" large scale war games. An important distinction to be
made is that the analytic technique to be discussed consists of a
complete model with all rules and decisions built-in, as opposed to
manual war games where human decisions are injected during the play
of the game and conflicts are often decided upon by umpires.
The type of war game that will be evaluated in this thesis is
the "paper" game which consists of a mathematical model, and the play

of the game is performed entirely by computer, In the critique of w
gaming to follow, the structure and components of computer Simula I
war games will be examined first, follov/ed by some discussion of the




iisk anyone to pass judgment on war game results and immediately
he asks, "V/hat are the assumptions of the game?" There seems to be
more concern with what goes into simulation than into any other form
of analysis In this chapter, the contents of a war game will be
explored with the hope of discovering the origin of this apprehension
about assumptions and seeing to what degree they differ from the
assumptions made in the solution of any problem containing undeter-
mined quantities
First of all, it should be noted th-t, in the short history of
operations research of military matters, many results of reports and
studies have been accepted as indisputable mathematical truth, and
some fleet doctrines have been based on these results- If the mathe-
matics could be verified, the assumptions often went unnoticed. With
the advent of computer simulation, however, the results are being held
provisional. It could be the physical form of the results which
causes such reservations. The results come out neatly arranged and
explicitly stated, yet one is forced to wonder hew they were generated,
Ho decisionmaker can accept results of this nature without some know-
ledge of their origin Certainly a military strategist must be satis-
fied with the a priori assumptions of a war game before he can take
action on the results, It may be a blessing that this type of analysis
has directed attention to assumptions made in all types of analysis,
whether the actual reckoning takes place within the computer or is
delineated in pure, but unintelligible, mathematical symbols, It is
becoming clear that the acceptability of results rests as much with

what is presupposed . with the rigor of lods ;d.
Assumptions occur in many shaj s and form Li srnal str
lure of '•.lie war game will now be examin d bo see where, atid. in what
form, assumptions arise, and whether they are necessary or justif: d
Of special interest vd.ll be the observation of those assumptions which
appear to be unique to the war gaming method
1 Mathematical approximations.
In the writing of a war game, all phenomena involved must be reduced
to mathematical form. In this reduction, approximations begin to appear.
Radar and sonar coverage areas might be described as perfect circles.
Navigation is often depicted with straight lines, Nuclear bursts are
given perfect spherical form. Equations are formed from extensions
of "best fit" curves to areas where no data are available* There is
no end to the estimations which must be mads when a physical situation
is being pictured mathematically.
With the necessity of approximations assumed, the problem wnich
presents itself to the analyst is the choice between an approximation
consistent with the latest scientific information, possibly unmanage=
able, or a form more easily handled but amounting to a cruder approx-
imation This problem is not unique to simulation. However, simula-
tion is an attempt to portray all the meaningful features of the real
world whereas much strictly mathematical analysis deals with idealized
cases and is satisfied with a specific maximization or minimization of
functional relationships Therefore, the burden seems to be on the
war gamer to seek the most accurate approximation that he can formu-
late and program. The heart of war game theory is the presumption

that while the performance of the entire military complex is unknown,
the performance of each element is known (8), If this were not the
case the gaming method would not be feasible. To "know" in this con-
text is to be able to describe the element mathematically as a numer-
ical parameter or as the root of an equation.
The equations and parameters used are themselves approximations.
They come from two sources : theoretical inquiries and empirical data*
Hopefully, the two will support each other. Generally, the war game
builder desires to describe an entire event, but information from the
two sources covers only parts of the event, This is often the case
when nuclear explosions are simulated. The theory of nuclear effects
is incomplete and the data available to date relate to a few specific
occurrences. Thus, if one is war gaming an A3W problem using nuclear
depth bombs, he has to account for the effects of these weapons with
very limited knowledge of their actual effects. Whether his approx-
imation will adversely affect the results will depend largely upon
the objective of the game. This relationship will be discussed later
in the section on game details
,
While the above approximation may be crucial, other approximations
appear to be both harmless and extremely handy. For example, in many
ASW problems a o^nar search pattern is determined by using the sonar
range as a radius to describe a circle about a transducer. Undoubted-
ly, the true search pattern is not a constant geometric shape, let
alone circular, but varies continuously with ship motion , water tem-
perature, etc. Unless it can be shown th t the actual pattern is
markedly different from the circular approximation, an attempt to
8

picture it more accurately would mean an increase in labor greatly
out of proportion to the increase in accuracy
The military war gamer must not only produce a mathematical approx-
imation for each element of the game, but he must also have some feel
for the sensitivity of each parameter in order to balance accuracy
with ease of handling. On one hand, the data may be so sparse that he
has no choice of degrees of accuracy and ease of handling is not a
problem. In this case, however, the limitation on the simulation does
not necessarily have to be a fatal flaw as long as those who aspire to
make use of the results are made cognizant of it. The merits of the
gaming technique should not rest on the fact that knowledge of the
real world is incomplete, but rather on how well it uses this know-
ledge to produce meaningful results.
With an abundance of data, on the other hand, accuracy and ease
of handling may both be affected by the limits of the computational
methods , Even if some action can be described mathematically, its
inclusion in the game may be prohibited by the capacity of the computer
to handle many such extensive calculations and still satisfy the
objective of the game in reasonable time and at reasonable costs.
When there is very little or no information available on a par=
ticular parameter, it is occasionally the practice to either assign
such parameters arbitrary values or ignore them completely. This
expedient usually breeds dark suspicious in the mind of the user.
There is other recourse „ It may transpire that someone with opera-
tional experience will be able to indicate whether the parameter in
question will be crucial to the objective sought. If not, the para-

meter can be injected into the game and allowed to take on a wide
range of values through different plays of the game This., of course,
is a lengthly procedure and may convert the simulation into a para-
meter sensitivity test. Such a test is not an unworthy use of the
simulation method since information as to the criticality of a para=
meter may not only provide a spark to further analysis -t but may also
lead to examination of the associated element in the fleet
These questions concerning the degree and desirability of mathe-
matical approximation lead directly to the problem of how much detail
should be included in the structure of the game,
2 5 Detail ,
Accuracy of detail . The accuracy of detail pertains to the assign=
ment of numbers to denote equipment performance or as part of the pre-
viously discussed mathematical approximations
.
Since a physical situation is being approximated, the detail in
the approximation cannot exceed the know detail of the real situation
Any attempt to represent a parameter with a number of six significant
figures when the parameter is only known to three will introduce un-
necessary error. A military conflict is simulated by delineating each
component which is of known capability and allowing the components to
interact in a perscribed manner- Errors introduced in the descrip-
tion of the components may very well become multiple errors as the
interactions occur. It would follow then that if an element or com-
ponent could be described adaquately by a single number or equation^,
it would be preferable to do so # rather than describe its subcom-
ponents in detail Whether this is the better approach will depend
on the purpose of the game.
10

The rule on accuracy seems to be: be as accurate as the current
knowledge of the actual item will allow, provided trie data can be mathe-
matically described and programmed within the practical constraints of
the simulation, No such rule exists when dealing with the amount of
detail
,
Amount of detail . Those engaged in building and using a war game
must, of necessity, consider every aspect of the situation being simulat=
ed, Part of this consideration is to limit or extend the completeness
of description of each event. The gamer is torn between two beliefs;
that everything of significance must be included^ and that a conglomer-
ation of detail can cause the program to become unwieldly and increase
the difficulty of having the game and its results understood and ap-
preciated. The urge to program every conceivable detail is fostered
by the apprehension that one cannot know the effect of an omitted
detail. It seems that a detail included and found unnecessary , can
be removed, but one left out may always provide grounds for declaring
the game "unrealistic". Elaboration^ therefore, is sometimes sought
in order to claim verisimilitude
While there is presure for detail^ there are strong reasons for
limiting it. The most obvious reason is that the work involved in
formulating the action mathematically and then programming it seems
to increase in a non-linear fashion as more sub-systems are described.
This practical consideration places an upper limit on the minutiae^,
but it does not provide a working rule with which to sift out the
essentials
How then , in a given game, can the amount of detail be decided
11

upon? In general, the answer to this question can be found only by
considering the objective of the game c In any game, the effects of
certain systems are to be studied while the rest of the game provides
the proper environment in which to evalulate these systems,, The
"atmosphere" should be created with a minimum of detail. If the object
of the game is to examine specific weapons or tactics , one is not only
concerned with the efi'ects of these systems but also with the causes
of their effects- Therefore, the critical element must contain enough
detail to ascertain, if possible, where weaknessess exist and what
components are most sensitive, On the contrary , elements of the sim-
ulation which are merely effects should be programmed as effects, not
only to save labor, but to insure that they are programmed as they
are experienced and not, generated erroneously by a complicated routine
containing many approximations
•
Suppose, for example, one is interested in testing the effective-
ness of shipboard missiles against attacking aircraft , It would be
appropriate to characterize the missile system in enough detail to
check all phases of its usage; firing, flight path, acquisition, kill,
etc. Even when this is done there will always be some doubt of the
completeness,, Should the weather be considered? How much should the
aircraft be allowed to maneuver? These questions , and many others,
appear to be answerable only with the advice and consent of the ulti=
mate user of the game, who presumably has operational experience in
this area 6 It may, however, be possible for the game itself to deter-
mine the significance of some of these factors*
On the other hand, a percentage of the attacking aircraft may
12

splashed for reasons other than missile hits. They may go down before
contact; they tray get lostj they may be brought down by surface anti-
aircraft fire of picket ships, or intercepted and destroyed by combat
air patrols. If we are interested only in shipboard missile effective-
ness, these other losses could just as well be lumped into one attri-
tion factor or "effect" and programmed as a single degradation of the
attacking force due to causes other than missiles. Where the desire
is to account for effects alone, it is often more accurate to program
the total and final effect per se rather than construct it from com-
ponent causes which may be less known * At the same time, it should be
noted that if the objective of the game is to study the effectiveness
of the entire task force against attack,, these other causes of "lost"
aircraft mu3t be described in detail
,
Consider the problem of determining ASW tactics against transit^
ing submarines , One common measure of effectiveness is kills per
transit c In arriving at a kill, many games are set up to include
contact, classification, torpedo firing, chase, acquisition, and kill
with a probability associated with each separate event., Is all this
necessary? Presumably, all action takes place after contact, The
number of kills may depend on a parameter attached to the torpedo or
some other part of the weapon system whose fuction is determined prob-
abilistically. Yet, if tactics are the prime concern, it may be suf-
ficient to tabulate only the number of contacts. The forces are usual-
ly arranged with regard to contacting the enemy and therefore the num-
ber of contacts per transit may prove a more useful measure of effective*
ness, while at the same time the calculations^, and resulting errors, of
13

pe - motion could be avoided. The incl * detail may even
have the effect of hiding the sought after data..
There exist sound reasons for the inclusion of a large amount of
detailed descriptions in any simulation;, but the gamer and the user
must constantly compare the necessity of this detail with the objective
of the game in order to hold it to a minimum,
3. Nonquantifiable assumptions .
The third consideration in this area is with assumptions which
may be called nonquantifiable, It is in this area where gaming en=
counters some unique difficulties,
As a war game is developed, all factors that arise in the field
are examined and some judgment has to be made as to whether the factor
is to be included, and in what form. The factors which are measurable
and can be determined empirically have been discussed above. These
include approximations, descriptions , details, and, in general, the
physical characteristics of the system under scrutiny.
Some factors cannot be quantified, yet are of extreme importance
in simulation and must therefore be taken into account when the game
is initially constructed For the most part, the nonquantifiable
performance involves the unpredictability of human behavior or the
unknown forces of nature-, Almost every event of a war game is pre~
dicated on the decision of someone in a position to initiate the action,
even though the event description consists only of the physical action
or just the effects of the action, Inherent in this procedure are
assumptions about human behavior, and such assumptions should always
be made with care. These assumptions are often called "hidden"
14

assumptions since they are seldom stated explicitly in the game des-
cription. Virtually every element introduced in to the game carries
with it an implicit or hidden assumption . Three broad areas of im-
plied assumptions ares enemy action and purposes, friendly forces
performance, and the natural environment *
Enemy action , In a computer simulated war game the enemy units
must be given some courses of action or s in a sense , animated. The
assignment of courses of action amounts to a major assumption,, and
care must be taken to avoid setting up a "paper tiger" to be destroy-
ed by the proposed forces of the war game user. The enemy conduct
may be predetermined or arrived at randomly ^ but it should be as
realistic as the game demands,
For example , in a submarine transit problem ^ the enemy submarine
must be assigned some track in order to present a threat , In some
simulations, an initial position is chosen randomly and the submarine
is dead reckoned in a straight path. Is this realistic? Probably
not, but is the assumption of a straight track detremental to the
value of the analysis? Here too, one mast look to the objective of
the game for a criterion. It may be preferable to us^ a series of
random positions, In either case^ some assumed motion is essential*
The above mentioned assumptions cannot be side-stepped and it is
imperative that the user understand and accept them if he hopes to
profit from the results
,
Friendly forces , Similiar assumptions appear in the account of
one's own forces, even if it only means assuming that they will carry
on in accordance with past performance. More often than not, future
15

performance must be assumed Like mathematical approximations, the
aim is to make assumptions as close to the real performance as feas-
ible. Often "a figure of merit," is assigned to the performance of a
piece of equipment in both actual and simulated usage of the gear.
This represents a more precise, but still only partially correct,
assumption of how the given equipment will perform when needed,
Frequently in war gaming, assumptions have to be made concerning
communications; an integral part of any military engagement. Even if
communications are not mentioned, the implication may be of one hundred
per cent reliability, which is a supposition worthy of careful study,
It may prove to be justified or even immaterial as regards the purpose
of the simulation, but it should not be overlooked or ignored
,
Natural environment - The third realm of supposition mentioned
above is the portrayal of the natural world. ''Assume a situation"
implies a myriad of "supposes" and they ail must be accounted for in
the final formulation of the problem. Accounting for such items does
not necessarily mean inclusion, but rather inclusion or thoughtful
rejection.
For instance, the underwater environment is of grave concern to
ASW forces and contributes to the headaches of those attempting to
effectively simulate the action against an evading submarine, The
effect of water temperature on the speed of sound alone causes grey
hairs amoung ASW tacticians, although it may be ignored by some war
gamers. The ignoring of this factor is itself an assumption that the
true tactical results can be obtained without considering explicitly
the effect of changing water temperature on a sonar search pattern
16

This assumption may be valid in some individual war games, but the
user Siiould be aware that it exists s
These are some examples of the numerous presumptions and con-
jectures which are part of any description of a real world situation,
especially a world as dynamic and complex as that of modern military
conflict, Since a perfect replica of the conflict situation is im-
possible to attain, one must settle for an imperfect model built 5
not only on known facts and sound theory ^ but also on assumptions
and personal judgments* The user of the war game cannot ask for
absolute reality, but he can ask that models which are far removed
from reality be explained and warranted before the results can be
accepted a3 reliable and useful data.
In closing, a distinction should be made between internal ap-
proximations, details, and assumptions, and inputs to the game it-
self. An input parameter may be a fact, an approximation, a figure
of merit, or a plain guess, but it is determined by the user to
describe an element or event as he wishes it to be described. The
problems explored in this chapter deal with the internal structure
of the game over which the game user very often has little control,
It is upon these features of internal logic that the decline or rise
of war gaming as an analytic device rests
Most of the internal description of factors regarding the fickle
ways of nature and fuzzy human behavior are handled mathematically
with the use of probability distributions and Monte Carlo techniques.






Thoughout the long history of war gaining^ the practitioner has
been consistently concerned with one important process) the decision
process. The game in its primitive form was used to "try out" tacti-
cal choices against supposed enemy action. The enemy action could be
entirely predetermined or improvised as the game progressed , Likewise
the decisions by the game player could be made as the situation evolved,
in which case the game provided decision making experience as well as
analysis. An entire series of possible decisions could also be laid
out before the game, thus establishing selection rule3 for action when
the facts called for a tactical decision* This latter type of setup
was, in reality, the testing of an entire war rlan for a strategic-
situation or the testing of a battle plan for a tactical situation,
The decision rules were conditional and formed a policy for action.
The purpose of the game was very often to test the effectiveness of
the military policy proposed,.
In modern war gaming, these two types of decision methods are
similiarly applied. The first method., utilizing human decisions
during the play of the game, is the prominent feature of the present
manual war games and tactical training devices , The second method,
in which decision rules are preprogrammed, forms the basis of current
computer simulated war games . Present war gaming analysis is not
restricted to the investigation of policy effectiveness alone, but
is used to examine such problem areas as determination of changing
force levels, need and utilization of improved weapon systems, and
18

many other factors bearing on the state of military warfare However,
the essence of simulation analysis is contained in its decision making
process which allows for the virtual carrying out of a complex mili-
tary interaction and the systematic following of it to its completion
In a strict sense, a decision is a conscious choice of a course
of action from alternative courses of action* The war gamer is looking
at the consequences which come to pass as a result of these choices
made by different units in the course of battle. In addition to the
above sense, the term "decision" will be used in this paper to signify
the outcome of an engagement of forces, as in the case of a prize
fight "decision" or the downing of an aircraft . One appeal of »var
gaming as a method of analysis lies in the fact that each event and
interplay of events is "decided upon",, or adjudicated, in the play
of the game as it would, or course, in the actual conflict
«
The simulated war game has the capability of letting the various
forces interact, or generating reactions, and of deciding conflicts
without definite knowledge of the tactical cross products. In other
words, it provides a "try it and see" technique . For purposes of
analysis, the ingredients of the decisionmaking process need not
be known since one is interested in the effects of the decisions on
the tactical situation, Essentially, there are two kinds of decision
processes in a simulation: the predetermined decision and the random
choice event
,
1. Predetermined decisions ,,
Very often in mathematical analysis the outcome of an interaction
is predetermined-, Since the outcome is forced by the events of the
19

game, there is no "choice" or uncertainty connected with the result.
A familiar example is a description of radar coverage areas as
circles ;tnd any intersection of this circle by a represented flight
path of a hostile aircraft is considered to be a detection which
automatically initiates a tracking event The decision to be made
here is when detection occurs and this has been determined in the
programming of the game. The play of the game consists of consuit
=
ing certain formulae or equations to check for geometric intersect-
ion » The procedure , in effect, represents a "decision" of nature
that detection is immediate A human decision could be simulated
in this case if the program were to track and interecept the in-
vader, since, in reality, a human decision is required to initiate
such action. Nevertheless, the decision to track all detected air-
craft has been made by the developer of the game, and is carried
out automatically when certain conditions are fulfilled.
Decisions which are predetermined to produce a definite response
to a definite situation have an analog in actual military policy
Standard operating procedures are ideally designed to insure a uni-
form and supposedly optimal response to certain tactical occurrences
,
In such cases, the decision is predetermined when and if the event
occurs in a certain manner.
In like manner, the effects of nature may be predetermined with
the utilization of equations based on experience and scientific in-
vestigation of the phenomenon involved- In the simulation of a
Examples; "track all unidentified blips";" if communications
are lost for five seconds on final . climb to two thousand feet and
hold"; "do not fire until you see the whites of their eyes 1 '
20

nuclear depth bomb burst,, damage may bo assessed in accordance with a
previously discovered rule, usually based on an estimated lethal radius
and the distance from target While this type of determinal ay
not be a perfect replica of the natural event , it will, if based
reasonable accurate data
>
describe the event in a useful way By
"deciding" the outcome of many such events, the game will hopefully
yield results similiar to the actual conflict results while^ at the
same time, creating a history of the battle which can be of immense
analytic value,
It can be seen, that if the entire conflict were carried out
using formulae and eouations which were completely deterministic
and allowed only this type of decision the "game" would be only an
analytic solution utilizing the computer as a bookkeeping device
There would be no choice or chance inherent in the interaction and
the simulation, as such, could not be proper3.y labeled a war game
2, Random decisions ,
It is obvious that the real world does indeed contain a large
measure of uncertainty especially when considering a clash between
two strong forces^, and this is appropriately carried over into a
realistic simulation of the analytic version of the opposition of
these forces
Before looking at the method of injecting chance into a problf y
it may be informative to see why it is desirable to do so- Consider,
once again, the aircraft entering the radar search circle In the
deterministic case contact is made if the two lines intersect, or more
explicitly j, if the two equations have a common solution Is actual
radar contact this certain? Suppose it was a submarine entering a
21

sonar range circle, would contact be 100 per cent certain? In either
case the ansv/er would most likely be in the negative, ujcperience shows
that each type of search equipment has some probability of contacting
a target at certain ranges. This probability may be hard to pinpoint
and will usually be estimated from test data or previous analysis.
In war game analysis it is generally preferaDle to reflect this reduced
reliability than to assume perfect performance.
In the examples mentioned earlier when predetermined human
decisions were simulated , one would naturally contend that standard
policy is not always carried out, and that responses to tactical
confrontations are not, in fact, uniform and predicatable . Some
mechanism to allow for human choice and human error seems appropri-
ate when describing the real world The results of human decisions
will always be uncertain and one aim of war game analysis is to
facilitate the improvement to tactics, policy, weapons, and military
planning in general to cope with this uncertainty -
Other human decisions of great importance are those whose effe
manifest the action of the enemy , It may be beneficial in some
analysis to restrict the enemy to a definite course of action, but
more often than not, especially in war gaming, the interesting results
are obtained against an unpredictable enemy,. His freedom of choice
is discernible when his motion is described in a probabilistic fashion,
The Monte Carlo technique . The vehicle for injecting choice or
randomness into a war game or any simulation is known as the Monte
Carlo method (24)* Probably the oldest and simplest use of this
method in military affairs consists of throwing the dice. This device
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is used today in manual war games and some fl>et exorcises, A torpedo^
for example, is launched against a submarine, either at sea or in a
"paper" exercise. It is desirable to make some assessment of possible
kill or damage Aside from using real war head, a dubious peacetime
practice, this determination of damage must be arrived at from the
known capabilities of the weapon and the armament of the submarine,
If the role of the dice turns out to be a previously specified value
or greater, a kill might be assessed, If not., the torpedo is assumed
to have missed or, perhaps, inflicted minor damage. From the stand-
point of getting on with the exercise , this constitutes a "decision"
as to the outcome of the attack* However, for analytic purposes,
little information is gained unless the set of kill "rolls" cor=>
responds closely to the actual kill probability.
The Monte Carlo method then is nothing more that sampling from
a probability distribution, which, it will be seen, does not have to
be known explicitly.
In computer simulations, the throw of the dice is replaced by
generation of a random number, Ir ... simple example, where the probabil-
ity of success is 60 per cent, a number is generated in a programmed
subroutine so that it lies randomly between 1 and 100^, then the gen-
erated number is compared with 60 to determine success or failure.
There are many elaborate subroutines to transform the random numbers
into an appropriate sample from any one of a number of common frequency
distributions such that generation of random numbers is analogojs to
sampling of a given population (10),
It should be noticed that when dealing with a given prcv ability
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distribution, one is sampling from an artificial population which has
a distinctive mean rmd variance already known,
The true usefulness of the Monte Carlo technique is manifest when
the analyst is faced with the situation in which > not one^, but larg- a
number of interactions are to occur, A brief description of a familiar
tactical problem may illuminate the use and merit of the Monte Carlo
technique
,
Consider the contact, trackings weapon launch, acquisition, and
kill of a submarine by a surface destroyer , In any defined geometric
configuration, it must be assumed that the probability of success of
each of the five aforementioned events is determined as an input to
the game. This minimum information is essential to the initiation of
the Monte Carlo process. The final overall kill probability does not
have to be known. Returning to the example, the game has progressed
to the point where the submarine has entered the sonar range of the
destroyer and has some probability of being detected; say e 8. One
could make a drawing from a box containing four white balls and one
red ball and thereby "decide" whether detection takes place or not,
As the submarine proceeds on course, determinations of this nature
could be made at regular intervals, using different probabilities
for different ranges. This procedure simulates tracking or possibly,
lost contact-, If contact is held long enough to justify an attack
another sample could be drawn from the "box" population corresponding
to the probability of a successful weapon firing and the success or
failure of the launch could be established. Once again, the geometry
of the model takes over and the two tracks are extended to find the
closest point of approach of the torpedo to the target From here
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the program goes to the probability distribution for acquisition,
usually a function of ranee, and hence, if applicable, to the final
determination of kill or miss from still another probability reflect-
ing the lethal power of the warhead,
A computerized war game can carry out the above interplay for
numerous forces on both sides. The Monte Carlo technique* by deciding
each interaction uniquely as it occurs , from given independent prob-
abilities
,
can lead to an end result through a large number of events
and intervening actions. This result, average number of kills or
average kill probability per transit, will approximate the mean of
the kill probability distribution which was never uniquely determined.
It must be emphasized again that the single event probabilities
must be introduced as inputs to the game, and that the Monte Carlo
method of sampling is not a computational device for arriving at a
definitive solution to the problem. The value of the results will
depend upon the assumed initial probabilities
The problem connected with any situation in which the individual
elements are reasonably well known is to assess the results when all
these elements are allowed to interact and intermingle. To try to
locate and separate each cross product distinctly is an immense task
and then each cross product must be related to still other combinations
of actions, the net effect being almost impossible to follow. The
Monte Carlo method offers a means of permitting each unit to carry on
its purpose and to respond in a manner similiar to its natural function
in its native environment, so that the total effect can be manifest
without being formulated. To be sure* the method does not define a
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solution, but only "keeps track" of interactions and "decides" con-






The most perplexing and pressing problem facing a military planner
who is dealing with war games is analysis of results. If the war game
is to be a useful ilytic tool the results -uust not only bo c^iisistent
and believable, but they must also contain enough meaning and relev-
ancy to be definite contribution to the decisionmakerr.
Many words have been used to describe war game results j valid ?
invalid, true, useful, unrealistic ^ hogwash, etc. It must be admitted
that the war gamer himself is usually most restrained in labeling his
product. The attempt in this chapter will be to organize a few of
these labels, so that the military reader may defend or attack such
results on relevant grounds and so that he will have some idea of the
worth of the data in his possession.
Before proceeding with analysis of results, one point snould be
raised at the outset. The purpose or objective of the simulation
must be firmly understood before attempting to make sense of the
results, This may seem obvious, but the easiest way to deceive one-
self is to study war game results as independent data without knowing
how or why they were generated Results not directly related to the
objective may be very enlightening,, However, they are better consid-
ered as subjects of further analysis than as end products. It should
be clear that only results which are direct offsprings of the explicit-
ly stated objective of the game should be given major attention.
This chapter will be confined to looking at results from three
aspects with the main aim being an attempt to aid the reader in making
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better judgments as to the worth of war game results, The three
aspects are: Stitistical Significance, Logical Validity,, and Compare
sion with experience and intuition
1. Statistical significance.
Upon completion of a run of a war game., the computer spews forth
a set of output data. One may well wonder why this cannot be treated
as the unique solution to the problem as in the case of many other
analytic studies. After all, one set of input parameters should yield
one result . It will be recalled Lh-t one distinguishing feature of
the war game is the employment of the Mon^e Carlo method in the decis-
ion making process. Using this method, there is no assurance that the
result of one play of the game is a very likely outcome. If the game
is run again with the same parameters, a new outcome may well appear
and may vary considerably from the former one, This is not surprising
when it is remembered that the outcome of the game is a member of a
probability distribution composed from many probabilities and one play
of the game is considered statistically as one drawing from a popula-
tion of all possible outcomes of the game. What the analyst is seek-
ing is some knowledge of the parameters which define this distribu-
tion of the outcome, namely, the mean and the variance, For example,
if the outcome of the game is the number of bomber penetrations, one
is not so much interested in individual plays as he is in the average
number of penetrations over many plays of the game. The obvious
question is how many.
By treating the results as samples from the population of pos=>
sible outcomes, the problem becomes one of statistical sampling
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theory. While there exists a great body of information on the subject,
this paper will be concerned only with what careful statistical analysis
can contribute bo the comfort of the military plainer confronted with
a myriad of data generated by a war game. Some assurance is needed
that the game has been played enough times to give the user a high
degree of confidence that the results adaouateiy represent the true
model output. In other words, he wants the answer -o the above ques-
tion of how many plays are needed.
The principle of statistical inference states that the parameters
of the parent population can be inferred from a study of the sample
distribution The degree of confidence in these parameters will be
determined by the sample size, which in war gaming means the number
of plays of the game with one set of inputs. The statistician can
arrive at a confidence interval about such a parameter which gets
smaller as the sample size increases
,
For example, in fifty tosses of a fair coin,, the proportion of
heads may vary from 0,4 to 0.6, but in 5*000 tosses the proportion
of heads will seldom vary more than from 0„48 to 0.52 (27) One is
more confident of the mean proportion of 0„5 with 5<,000 tosses., In
war gaming, one is usually interested in some mean number of kills.,
or contacts, or penetrations, and the statistician might examine
the results and announce that the mean number is 27 with a 95$ con-
fidence interval from 24 to 30, This means that there is an object-
ive probability of 0.95 that the mean will lie within this interval.
An increase in sample size may reduce this interval or produce a
similiar interval with 99/6 confidence. Such an improvement may be

very costly in additional plays required. The war game us^r has to
make a judgment about the size of the sample desired. If the confi-
dence interval is adaquate for his use, he would be well advised to
limit the number of runs for at least two reasons. First, computer
time is expensive, and secondly, the war gamer is usually desirous
of making parametric changes to the inputs and then examining the
new results. This requires multiple plays of the game for each change
of inputs, each needing statistical vindication.
Other statistical methods can be of value in further analysis of
the game results. A co::mon practice in gaming analysis is to vary
one important parameter and note the effect, if any, on the output.
Suppose increasing sonar ranges were arbitrarily assigned to a sur-
face unit in an ASW exercise, and a linear increase in contacts per
transit was experienced. The assumption of linearity can be verii'ied
by examination of the data using statistical methods of correlation
and regression analysis (6).
What does the statistical significance of results mean to the
beneficiary of war game results? It tells him, primarily, when he
has played the game a sufficient number of times to have a high
degree of confidence that the mean and variance obtained is the true
population parameter of the output. This confidence should not be
unrestrained since the statistical methods deal only with the numbers
produced by the model as it stands and the "population" of plays per-
tains to the model and not necessarily to the real conflict being
simulated. The statistician is only assuring him that the number
that he is looking at is representative of the average outcoue of
the model and not a fortuitous case where the internal decision

mechanisms have produced an unlikely result Other mathematical
treatments of the results, i e
,
graphical analysis, regression
analysis, should be viewed in the sane light, as truisms about t e
model, not about what is being modeled
Much information about the nature of outputs and the relation-
ships between inmits and outputs can b^ extracted from this type of
analysis. However, the burden is still on the war gamer to relate
this information to the actual tactical or strategic situation, fie
must ask not only if the results are valid in the model, but do they
correspond to their image in reality.
2. Logical validity .
In formal logic, a conclusion is considered valid if it is
arrived at by rules of reasoning of a definite and consistent form.
Rules governing the subject and predicate of the major and minor pre-
mise will determine the validity of the conclusion , Once the validity
of the conclusion is established, the truth of it will depend on the
truth of the premises , If the conclusion is valid, meaning it follows
logically from the premises, tnen one can establish the truth of it if
he can establish the truth of the premises. An invalid conclusion,
since it does not follow logically from the premises cannot be labeled
true or false from knowledge of the truth of the premises . A conclu-
sion may, of course, be invalid, but true-. The rules of formal or
mathematical logic can become very involved, but the underlying
principle is to construct the logic in such a way that agreement is
reached on what conclusions can bo drawn from known facts and which
conclusions are supported by the facts and which are not.

War game results may be looked at as conclusions in the sense
that they follow from the internal logic of the game. The question
facing the analyst is whether they follow by the rules acceptable to
him and does the playing of the game always take the course intended
by the user. In any mathematical study, the one who must act on the
results must be satisfied that the outcome follows from the input
according to the laws of logic, or laws of set theory, or of trigo-
nometry, or whatever disclipire is being used. Tv.ke, for example,
the elementary trigonometric equation for finding the length of the
third side of a triangle, when two sides and the included angle are
given (The Law of Cosines)-. After seeing the "law" developed from
basic geometric and trigonometric postulates, and being satisfied
that the logic is sound, the user will confidently insert inputs
(the two given sides and angle) and find the value of the third side.
To him, the result is valid, and true if the three original inputs
were true to whatever they represented.
Logical validity of war game results is essentially the same
concept, but much more difficult to achieve in practice. If one could
trace through the entire program to ascertain the rules used in the
determination of the outcome, then he could be assured of the validity
of the results. He might like to know whether the equations reflect
logically consistencies, like, to take a simple case, are rad r contacts
adjudged only within contact range of the piece of rad'i.r?
The value placed on game results by the military planner will
vary directly with his confidence in the validity of the process.
Since he supplies the inputs and is responsible for their "truth",

he needs only the assurance that the often elaborate and complex game
logic is giving him a logical flc* from input to output. This assur-
ance is in addition to an awareness of the approximations and assump-
tions mentioned in chapter two. 'Dxcept in the case where the game user
and the builder are the same person, it will be next to impossible
for the user to trace through the entire game to satisfy himself
with the logical consistency of the structure. To some degree, he
must rely on the skill and integrity of bhe individual who built the
game
,
This confidence may be attained by a fully documented game, or,
more easily perhaps, by a close and informative partnership between
the user and the builder throughout the development of the game. This
partnership is difficult to attain at present, since many war games
are being built primarily by civilian a: alysts, sometimes working close-
ly with the military, and sometimes working in an academic ur non-
military atmosphere. ^ Some familiarity with gaming techniques by the
military officer is essential, and a working relationship of the
military with the civilian analyst would be very beneficial*
The builder of the game is usually convinced of the logical and
mathematical consistency of the system, but he must transmit this
conviction to the military officer who must act on the results. In
doing so by the method proposed above, the war gaming technique may
serve as an agent in increasing the rapport between the civilian
.analyst and the military tactician.
The degree of association with the military varies-. This work
is being done in many places; The Applied Physics Laboratory, The





3 . Comparsion with oxperience arid intui tion
,
Another definition of validity specifies that statements or
conclusions are valid if they can be supported by facts or empirical
evidence. It is this test of the war game results which is most
elusive and controversial. It is comforting to be confident of the
logical structure of the model, and to know that the results are
statistically significant, but given such a case, the analyst must
now consider how much can be inferred about the real situation from
the use of the model. Building ar. accurate and logical model clears
the first hurdle, but establishing the relevance of the model is the
crucial imrdle to cross. Unfortunately, there is no sure way to arrive
at the realization that a model of a military conflict is relevant and,
undoubtedly, unanimity of opinion will never transpire.
The model gets its meaning from reality, and the usefulness of
a war game is measured by the quality of the knowledge which can be
inferred about the real world by playing the game. The proolem is
one of properly making inferences from the simulated engagement. This
translation of numerical results from an artificial situation to use-
ful facts about reality is the ultimate responsibility of the military
decisionmaker.
Two somewhat formal tests of logical validity and statistical
significance have been suggested to tie input values to results. The
third test of tying the game results to the real world by comparsion
with experience and intuition is by nature less formal and requires
continuous study, reappraisals, and subjective judgments, together
with whatever data can '^e obt lined from similiar fleet exercises.

Some examples may illuminate the nature and scope of decisions
which may be called for when determining the usefulness of war game
results. Suppose a war game is devised to simulate a hunter-killer
team stationed in some defined area to prevent transit of enemy sub-
marines. All units have been programmed as having capabilities which
they presently enjoy, many of which will, of necessity, be probabilistic
in form, The object of the game is to evaluate current tactics against
this threat. The military planner is satisfied with the structure of
the game, has supplied the input parameters, and has played the game
a sufficient number of times to arrive at statistically significant
results. Upon examining the results, he discovers that one type of
unit, say for example the ASW helicopter, is very seldom involved with
a kill, and almost never credited with an initial cont:ct. Does one
conclude that the helicopter is really not essential to the hunter-
killer team and should be removed. If not, where do ./ou look to
explain the outcome which may be in disagreement with the outcome of
similiar exercises run at sea.
Consider another submarine transit problem, this time using an
SSK barrier. Once again, the barrier is set up to prevent enemy
submarine transit through a specified area. The game is run using
inputs as realistic as available, and the results show on the average
19 kills per 100 transit attempts over several plays of the game, A
similiar fleet exercise is performed with results that 8 out of 10
submarines are killed. Here again, there may be a temptation to
declare the model useless, since after all, the criterion for a good
model is the predictive quality. Here an average of 0-19 kills per
transit is predicted and actually 0.8 kills per transit occur.

These are but examples which point out rossi le conflicts which
may arise when war game results are compared with experience and in-
tuition. While there is no pat procedure to resolve these dilemmaa,
some guidelines can be listed to ease the burden of the decisionmaker
faced with the task of making the best use of all sources of informa-
tion available. They should be applied whether the game results are
appealing or disconcerting.
Do not try to compare two different tilings . A model is not the
real thing and was never intended to be even though it may reveal
truth about the real ivorld. Model results, looked at in absolute
terms, are different in nature thai, live results, and comparsions of
the two are difficult. The environment of the fleet exercise will
probably be different from that simulated, and more important, the
rules of assessing damage or kill are often not the same
Look for relative improvement . The problem of comparing two
types of results can be avoided by making comparsions within the
game itself. If the purpose of the game in the second example is to
evaluate tactics, game results should be com) .re I Lth oth - . . Its
from the same model, but produced using different tactics . H re a
marked increase in the number of kills or contacts, using the same
input capabilities, may indicate a superior tactic If a fleet
exercise demonstrates the same increase with the new tactic, some
good has been realized, regardless of the absolute number of kills or
contacts by each method. An improvement in the game could lead to an




Reexamine inputs first When attempting to resolve discrepancies,
reexamine input parameters first rather than tinker with the basic logic
of the game. One of the useful analytic purposes served by fleet exercis-
es is to shed some light on the performance characteristics of the var-
ious units. These performance characteristics are important inputs to
the game, and erroneous ones may lead to strange results. As the ga>;.e
is continually adjusted to better reflect reality, the major adjust-
ments will be to update the effectiveness parameters of the weapon
systems described. In the first example, fleet experience may sno^
that the helicopter has a much higher effective sonar range than was
supposed in the model and hence, a greater contact probability. In
which case, a correction in the model may produce results demonstrat-
ing the ubefulness of the helicopter in the hunter-killer team. If
not, the simulation may point the way to further critical analysis
of the composition of the team.
Changes in the internal logic should follow only from a new and
genuine understanding of the essence of the physical world which is
being pictured. This will be more important in future games where no
operational data is available for comparsion and the best one can do
is to stabilize the model and vary the inputs,
Do not .jud^e the frame by the results alone . Mien the results come
out in close agreement with preconceived views of the user, he may be
tempted to consider the game valid, realistic, and even extremely
astute. Likewise, results which contradict a pet theory are in danger
of being branded useless and subsequently abandoned. On the contrary,
the model should be evaluated by itself and not on the believability
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of the results, «s in th'j logical syllogism, one strives to construct
a system which will produce valid conclusions, the truth of which will
depend on the establishment of the truth of the premises. If validity
of results, in a logical sense, can be obtained, at least with reson-
able assurance, then there will exist a connection between inputs and
results that will make it easier to examine both, The model should
be judged on its internal aerit and the results should be judged only
in light of the assummed inputs.
I

C - lPTER V
OBJECTIVES
Having reviewed the more important f matures of modern computer
simulated war games, the remainder of this thesis will be iddressed to
the problem of the usage of gaming techniques to further military object-
ives. The present chapter will be concerned with objectives to be sought
by the employment of the war game.
The military officer is continuously aware of the necessity of
making the most efficient use of his resources in hand, of planning for
new weapon systems, and of devising means of evaluating the i . systems
as they evolve. The theoretical side of this day-to-day appraisal is
in the domain of operations analysis, and the objectives of w< r gaming
dc not differ appreciably from the routine objectives of operations
analysis. The simulated war game is another tool of analysis which is
still developing, and, like all new methods, can be of greal value i:l. -..
used effectively and applied to problems which are amenable to this
type of discipline, While discussing war game objectives, it may be
observed that the classical purposes of war gaming arid the post World
war II purposes of operations analysis blend together in analytic war
gaming and ceuld bring to military decisionmakers a new appreciation
of each method.
It has been emphasized throughout this paper that th s obj ctive
of the game must be understood \y .. i (and, of course, '.. ilder)
in order to appreciate and, perhaps, tolerate the assumption or or:e end
and the results on the other. This chapt r 'ill outline some of th
feasible objectives of simulat d war gam s md, where appropr:
,
point




lysLin" of war plans
.
The testing of war plans on of h historic uses of th
war game. The idea was to devise a :omplet plan of attack to acheive
some desired military end, and then to "play it" against suppos .. my
responses, while taking into account, if possible, chance happ 5
which occur in any conflict situation. Weal ;.^.: nis in the plan w
corrected as they became apparent, and often, as a side product, insight
was gained into a new tactical approach, The war game offered a: oppor-
tunity to "try out" prcpos d pi ins prior to the time when they must be
used fo*- "keeps", The evolution of military tactics parallels, in some
ways, the development of philosophy, in that heavy reliance was placed
on the accumulated wisdom, of the past and the insight of a few geniuses
who crystallized concepts into workable rules. There was no method,
outside of war gaming, to continuously evaluate and revise tactics in
times of peace. The analytic war game, as a tester of plans, continues
to assist in tints area,
The modern computer simulated war game can and does serv . ..his
classical purpose; namely, the evaluation of various tactical proposals
for handling and array of threatening situations, With this objective
in mind, the game should be built with a serious intent of describing
the military capabilities, x& y end friendly, as accurat ly as th
are known to date. When the stat ;d purpose is such a gen s.1 valuation,
the assumptions, approximations, and internal structure must be geared
to serve this purpose, This requires a true reflection of the real
situation if comparsion of plans is to be meaningful. It can be seen
that by taking as one's object'/ he determination of th st master
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plan, the game must bo made not only large, but accurate in essential
detail, This requirement for accuracy of description of an ;ntire modern
war plan means that this objective can b ichieved only wit i a gr i
expenditure of time and effort, even 1'-. bhi aid of high speed computers,
It may be advisable to seek a smaller objective on some occasions to
avoid having to describe too large a conflict in minute detail,
2, Effectiveness of tactics ..
The difficultly mentioned above can be reduced somewhat by consider-
ing only subelements of the overall strategic picture, thereby concen-
trating on local, relatively indep< ndent, tactical situations resulting
from threats less than world wide. In this way, the war gamer can
ignore or hold static many aspects of ths environmental backdrop against
which the engagement is played and thus reduce the detail required ind
make assumptions less demanding in verisimilitude*
Consider, for example, the defense of a mercantile cenvoy against
hostile submarines. It may be the case; that only two methods of defense
are proposed: excort destroyers, together with ASfo helicopters placed
aboard the merchant ships, or a supporting hunter-killer team steaming
in the vicinity of the convoy. The objective is to compare the sffective-
ness of the tv ro teams against the same threat* This can be simulated
with less detail than on zould suppose at first glan . The convoy,
in each case, can be programmed as a unit with little detail other than
course, speedy and liml. d maneuvering ability. The enemy action can
consist of attacking submarines of given capabilities, but the atten-
tion to detail in describing these capabilities can be lax d is long
as the same threat is pres nted to sach proposed t am The description
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of the enemy threat must I v i I Lj . :ura , but th important 1
is to make it similiar for :h valuation. For this limi e objective,
the environment can be assumed to be mid-oc \ u , removing bl need for
considerable geographic detail. If, on the other hand, the convoy prob-
lem was to be part of a test of a general war plan, it would most likely
have to be programmed from start to finish in accurate detail it .
less general objective, the labor of buildinj .hi mod I maj - . reduced
considerably more than the cor.:' iponding loss in generality,
A point can be mad'; here concerning th< r lationship between object-
ives and results. In the case of the limited objective, bhe g ... may
"find" one method of ..envoy defense more effective tactically than the
other against a given threat, but this does not imply thai it should
necessarily be chosen. The objective was to determine tactical superior-
ity, while other considerations such as cost, maintenance, n sed for
defense, probability of threat, etc., remain for further analysis. The
overall war plan, if it could be modeled, might try to cover these items,
but it should be remembered that the war game may accomplish its objectiv<
and still not answer all the pertinent questions on the subject.
3 Development of new tactics .
While discovery of new tactics is often a happy outcome of analysis
designed to examine current tactics, it can also be a proper objective
itself. As a matter of fact, the creation of new tactics to meet the
rapidly changing threats of bhe cold war is a paramount impoi I tc in
modern military planing
Original tactics very often come ibout as a r suit of some mutation
or reordering of cure n1 tactics as they ai :arrj d out in the battle.
The experience gained from mployi uilty maneu Li field 'ill
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be wisely used to contribute to different and better tactics in the
future, This experience, combined with ;.rof" r;-ie. tl i ioni md Insight,
has been the main ingredient of new tactical theory
The war gaming method, hen given possibiliti s of multitudinous
plays of a single battle by the oomputer, can investigate many combinations
of available tactical forces to screen for a better appro cl :. prob-
lem. One no longer has lo rely on happenstanc ci— i itions '.:..; ai
in battle to see fortunate tactical employments, Lik ;;ise, proposed
tactical innovations by military theorists can b ; valuat id in a simulat
field environment in the same manner as ;urr nt tactics, and th orld
does not have to wait for war to test bh fe .:;.! ilit^ of n w and revolu-
tionary approaches to a conflict situation,
4. Determination of future ne.-->ds .
The post '.'orld War II philosophy in national d fen?; Ls - d not
only on having sufficient forces in b dn ; to cope with ^ny threat, but
also to be continuously developing new weapons and tactics to defend
against all convciveablo weapon systems which the snemy .,-3 prospects
of possessing.
In this regard, it is a logical objective of war gaming :...lysis to
aid in this critical determination of future needs. In a given war game,
the gamer has the privilege of setting forth the snemy capabilities,
against which he will attack •.;• defend. It is possible to increase the
enemy capability by simply imp "ovi
,
; :h input j u tmet i ich descri
his action, The game is then run usinj xi tal . .s of on V- own
fleet to discover how bad things \ ill and mits are going to
particularly vulnerable, Bj making inc] mental param :s
to correspond to improvement *. ''. ' pabilit: , .. letor-

mination can be made as to th' d gr of improvement n ,ry to m et
future threats
It is oft'. a easy to s;e intuitivelj just where one's own fleet will
suffer a disadvantage if the enemy inherits improved capabilities, but
the degr *e or quantitativ m isu •:• of s If impro/em ::t needed and the
exact nature of the weapon to sneompass this improvement art; not simply
visualiz ;d.
5« Correlation between units .
The Navy is in possession of raan^ different, sometimes conflicting,
fleet units with which to do the job of controlling -he seas. In A.S
alone, there are three types of fix d rjj 5 aircraft, helicopters,
destroyers, submarines, and numerous other systems with overlapping
capabilities of detecting^ tracking ind hilling enemy submarines, one
of the challanges of naval leadership is to mold these div irs units
into an efficient and mutually complementary beam h iving th highest
probability of accomplishine th mission.. This problem is no different
in concept than the ancient problem of deploying the cavalry, infantry,
and artillery is such a way so as to achi v ; the maximum coordir. ition
and destructive power.
Modern tactical theory is often blocked because of che inability
to identify and quantify the effect of one unit on the oth ~ s rhen they
supposedly working tow rd i sam nd Ther exists, • . . -it
is explicitly stated or not, mutual interferenc , not all of which is
involuntary. On way to attack this pre lem Is to phy >ic 1.II3 try th
various feasible coiabinations enou Lmes to apj Ls s the different
p rformance. For example, can destroyers tra ind ! lc! - rin
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better in conjunction with ] b ol ' "craft, helicopt rs, or alon 7
is no shortage of opinions on this qu stion, but it is difficult tc :
;
sufficient data from at-sea trials ba m asure bhs correlation b '
units, mainly because each trial is different and comparsions los-. their
meaning.
This type of comparsion is not impractical in computer war game
analysis, where the ease of repeating plays mak h the determination of
this correlation an attainable and worthwhile objective, fith this
modern analytic tool, it is possible bo arrive at a quantative measure
of the interaction among units comprising a large military command,
6, Oth 'j r ob.'i ;cbiv .s .
The objectives listed in this s-.ction are typical of the; ones sought
in current war gaming and, for that master, are simili^r to the objectiv s
of all forms of analysis contributing to military planning, Dios : m n
tioncd are ones particularly suited to war game analysis, and many combin-
nations of these objectives arc found in current military models.
There are many variations of the above purposes. To su.^g-st a few:
a war plan may be a def ;ns 5 plan, i.e, the establishment of the SA( '
system or an equivalent system; future needs may be logistic rather than
tactical as in a simul tic;; analysis of the sea lift or air lift capa-
bility. Finally, in the area of tactics and correlation effects, the
number of possible objectives to be pursued are increasing faster with




MILITARY I 80BLEMS SUITaBL SIMULATION
/ ry often in military affairs today, ihen bh ' Lsionmaker is
faced with a threat which can be met with a variety of means it .is
disposal, he will look to the w ir game for a clarification or ultimate
solution of the problem. What is there .bout war game analysis that
mak?;s it a wise choice in any given problem? In this chapt r, the
conditions germane to a problem which make it amenable to war g
analysis will be discussed, with the purpose of giving the decisionmak r
a better base on which to choose bh m ans of analysis best suited to
assist him. The format will be in the form of questions which should
be asked and answered about each problem recommanded for solution by
this method.
1, Is the problem factorable ?
T/»1ien experimenting in the physical sciences, the experimenter at-
tempts to hold as many conditions as possible constant that are not
subjects of his study. He is, in a sense, factoring out one character-
istic of bhe physical situation and examining it independently, liis
success may depend on whether the o tserved effect is, in fact, indepen-
dent of the environment
.
A military exercise may be considered as an sxperimentj on. in
which there is very little control of the environment. In military
analysis, howevar, it is desirable to look at one event or interaction
at a time in an at mpt to do a finite mathematical study and thereby
find an opti.al or effecient way in which the event should take plac
Unfortunately, when dealj with a conflict situation in the real .-/orId,
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governed by human action, it is v r, .wki ard to hold b s enviroruaent
constant to perform an analysis on one ev nt. It is in bhis exig i cy,
where factoring is impractical, that am might turn bo th war am*
A factorable event can ^ ; r.-moved from its environment and studied
separately, whereas a nonfactorabl ev nt cannot (l6)« For example, the
determination of the most e ' ectiv..- size of a depth bomb maj nade
without considering th.; tactical atmosphere in which it is to be dropped.
Once a criterion is decided upon (explosive power per pound, lethal
radius, ship mounting conv nience, etc), reasonable results can b
obtained. On the other hand, the problem of the most effective use of
destroyers in a hunter-killer team cannot b<: abstract .d from the con-
text of the local tactical situation. The deployment of destroyers
is not independent of such items as; the sxp ct d threat, aircraft
availability, and the number and makeup of all the units in the area.
Thus, the ASW picture;, on a tactical level, a]
i
ars to be nonfactor-
able , Weapon capability, sonar and radar equipment, flight operations,
and other facets of the prob] sra i^ay be improved independently, but when
it comes to the be3t use of units or weapons in a unified plan, the
analysis becomes muddled. Th< most efficienl use of destroyers cannot
be added to the most efficient use of helicopters in the same an a with
bhe hope of getting the most efficient combination, You may, in fact,
get chaos. The helicopter search plan maj b based on cov ring the
maximum area of ocean space in some defined contact ar a, while the
destroyers may be striving for containment. Both plans could be inde-
pendently optimal, but the combined sffort maj b< ii ff: L nt,
operation planner must now become concerned with a new situation and
try to devine the corr latio] h uniti

Taking th group ... . hoi , L , noi factored, seriously complicates
th mathematical analysis, - situation which g ts wors as more ...
units arrive ©n the sc* n . E\ . bo an xp -ri snc i op srational comi r,
the nonfactored tactical problem is a dailj source of study and reapprai-
sal.
From the analytic point cf view, the nonfactor .'• problem can be
handled with more assurance by the w ir gaming method. In the game, as
mentioned earlier, each unit and its effects arc described independently
and thrown together in in artificial world to examine their interations.
The success of each combination against a given threat can be measured,
and better combinations may become obvious when the data is assembled.
The war game is doing, in effect, what cannot be don:; in the fleet; try-
ing a large number of procedures and tactical configurations against
similiar enemy actions,
2, Does a definite analytic solution exist ?
Even when an event can be factored, it may be troublesome to analyze.
One must choose a criterion by which to judge the results. ..'hen conduct-
ing ASW search, does one choose to maximize the ocean area covered in a
given time, maximize the probability of containment, minimize the time to
regain contact, or even minimize fuel consumption? For a definite mathe-
matical analysis, some measure must be chosen, and it may not be adaquatc
when the entire situation is considered.
In /ar gaming, it is possible to holr! the selection of this measure
in abeyanc s, nd examine the results as one would examine the results of
an at—sea exercise. Some of the above measures may be within reasonable
constraints already and not in ne d of sp cializ ed attention
may sufficiently illuminate the interactions involved to

more ra aningful factored in lytic studies can be initiated.
In still other cases, the cur: mathematical methodology is not
capable of dissecting certain tactical arrangem nts, or eonceiveably,
the circumstances have not been consid -red from a mathematical viewpoint.
In either case, the war game may prove to b • the only curr nt approach,
and its usefulness can be justified by the fact that it can produce
results when they are need i and not forthcoming from other anal} tic
methods in the forseeable future. When - definite analytic solution to
a pressing problem is not likely, it is suggested that the war gaming
technique be considered, provided it fits the needs of the problem.
Nevertheless, as pointed out in chapter four, the results must meet
certain standards to be given credence, and should not be clutched too
lovingly simply because they are the only answers available.
3 . Is fl;:.:t evaluation pract \.c."..l?
An analytic war game is by nature closely related to the manual
or actual war gam- « They both seek the same objectives. The "paper"
gam is considered when it is impossible or impracLic-al to make the
desired evaluation in the fl < t with actual combat units, and, quite
reasonably, the real life game should be utilized wh -n iu is feasible.
It may turn out that the most profitable arrangement will bo fleet
exercises run in conjunction with simultaneous simulationi
Computer war gaming is not an inexpensive passtime, and may not
be justified if the same data 3an b3 obtain d from fleet exercises
which must be conduct rl anyway for braining purposes. Better data
processing in present operations could reduce the n A ?d for a consider-
able amount of artificial investigations. On the other hand, if the
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cost of certain fleet exercises is prohibitive, the simulation met
may become economically attractive.
U , Is the use of nuclear weapons anticipated?
This question is related directly to the previous one, but is asked
separately because of the distinctive nature of evaluation of tactics
involving nuclear weapons. These events cannot be properly evaluated
at sea. This realization, coupled with the fact that many modern
weapons have never been tested in their present form, forces the mil-
itary analyst to rely heavily on scientific studies and simulation.
The Navy today is faced with a growing arsenal of weapons whose
capabilities are not fully known. These weapons are becoming the core
of our attack ensemble, and tactics must be designed to use them effec-
tively. In a war game model, the nuclear effects can be given a wide
range of values and various attack plans may be tested over this range,
Hopefully, one plan will prove effective in that part of the range gener-
ally believed to be the true measure of the weapon capability. In this
area, simulation may prove to be of exceptional value*
5 Does the proposed tactic depend on enemy action ?
This question may seem trivial since the answer will be in the af-
firmative in every case, nevertheless, a great bulk of the military
analysis is done without considering specific enemy action, or else one
definite action is assumsd for a particular study, The response of the
enemy is "factored cut", This is often the case in studies of effective-
ness of weapons, where the design of the weapon is such as to optimize
certain fuctions (power vs. weight, convenience of delivery, etc.) with-
out regard to the specific action of the enemy. If the weapon is properly
delivered, the assumption is that enemy response is limited to dying
gracefully

In a larg t a of mili I ' , . tactical r^. L^ns
involve tracking, searc] ing, L - i , .-. id j : ' " ; units for
weapon delivery, it may b - 3 c ivii to ignor , -r arbitrarily assign,
the enemy action.
Anti-submarine search plans, for x inpl< , ' som< tim s bas .d on
the principle of maximizing th \ amount of oc an s sarched in a given
time assuming that the- enemy is or will be in th< i • a s sarched. This
is often the most profitabl< approach when intelligence is sparse or
completely lacking as to his approximate whereabouts. If, however,
a datura had been established, a search based on ocean coverag
,
while
maximizing the amount of high prob bility area searched, may not max-
imize the probability of detection. 1 n such doubt arises, one tries
the plan against some representative enemy vasiv techniques to obtain
a measure of success of the tactic. These tests may be run at s ;a or
on paper. If the results are not satisfying, then the w r gaming
technique may be helpful. The search plan can b modeled, programmed,
and tried against a groat variety of individual submarine man uv rs.
Used in this way, as a tester of bactical plans, th ar g ime often
proves to be an excellent complement bo definitive studies.
Consider the case of air lefens« . Often a likely enemy air attack
plan is suggested and the decisional ker s .Is s quantity of ' -pons and
an arrangement of forces sufficient to m< st and d if li this type of
assault, After the study has provided for an optim 1 deployment of
forces, it may come to pass that this "optimal" solution is very
inefficient if the u my choos ss an unorthodox or unthoughtof me1
of attack. Rather than do n i study for ach imagij 1 mj action,
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it may b d sirable to program th d E" . nd run simulat -1 iir at-
tacks using all sorts of attack patt
The principle of allowing t nem, fr doin of action wh n plan-
ning defense go^3 back to the first gaming, where the fundam ntal qu s-
tion was; "If ho does this, then what iction do w take?", and this
question was asked throughout the pla^ of bhe game. This principle is
still applicable today, but is often ov srlookod in the ag of ultimate
weapons, where the emphasis is on total d fense r th r than f rise





ADVA] rAG : .. H DISaDVAUT iGES
While it is hoped that the reader will have, at this time, a
g neral notion as to the advantages and pitfalls to be ocpect d in th-
us', of the war gaming technique, it s yas appropriate to close bhis
thesis with a specific delin ation of LI. ass ts ind lial ilities th
the practitioner can anticipate. It may branspir that, in quantity,
the advantages outweigh the disadvantag : when a list of sach is
composed. However, one should rememt r that with any bechnique in its
early development the advantages bend .o be alleged advantages, while
the drawbacks are those which have actually been sxperieric I, On
serious drawback, discov •;• .d at the compl tion of an slaborat md
costly war g';ae can nullify a great I al of hard labor, and outweight
many supposed advantages, A checklist, while not achaustive, will
set forth here with the hope that by using it one may avoid such pro-
spective disasters.
One judgment will never be entirely applicable to a sp scific
problem considered for solution 'oy -ar gaming, but ib is envisioned
that the description of
_,
.v r^l wd'/anoa^-js and dis dv .. t .-; of the
method will assist the military planner in consigning his particular
problem bo the proper analytic technique.
There are many ways of ittacking p oblcm, all of ihich may
have mutual advantages. The cone i n lere, hov/ever, will be with the
particular features of bhe war game- which sufficiently distinguish
it as having unique advanta ; s ind lisadvantages,
Th ; citing of these sel :tic . •• Lt ria is mi mt b< Ld t mili-
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itary decisionmaker In raining . „ Lpoier I -
propos d bhat the adv ' ' M is dv rpo raring r for pur-
suing this approach, or- bhrit th draw ,ck3 b us d to cond m thod,
but that both be und rstood and aj
,
' it d when using th t ihniqu md
acting on the results,
1 Advantages ,
A solution Aiij be found - h ;r no ^„b'.r :.xist".d . It cai not b
denied that a system which produces m nsw r rh re none j riously
existed has an advantage over other systems trying to solve Lhe s ....
problem. Indeed, this has be n one of the primary "selling points 11 of
computer simulated war games, In bhc complex military world today,
only a method which can cop. with all the probabilistic events md
unknown correlations can suitably describe the conflict in terms com-
plete enough to yield valid results, ™}i- gaming techniqu i. proposed
to get a gross idea of the magnitude of an outcome when no concept of
this outcome is in being. As they say in the trade, "to get a h* -die
on the problem"
,
This advantage is b icoming mor md more dominant as in attempt
is made to analyze the current defense posture in the atmosphere of
possible nuclear exchange, b'ith the offense and defense springing
to action immediately : d with on.: dep< ndin
;
on the other, to an un-
known degr } md both depending on th mem^ .pproach md capability,
the search for a "solution" to the global equation is tedious md
unending. The war game is grasped in hopes of generating some initial
idea of the quantity and quality of forces n jeded in both our offensive
an I d jfenoive syst . li

The cynic ... iy ask, "Is . gross (or ; r^ •:) u r b . r bh i
ansi r it ull? !: A good qi . I i if r .raits ol b 5 i - :- ft Dm pour
games are paraded .is the only truth cau! 'hoy constituti the only
existing solution to the problem In bhis deceptiv< nd d i i srous
situation total ignoranci may be pref i ible, but a discerning decision-
maker will avoid this trap bj car ful u ilysis of bh results
suggested in chapter four, Ind ed, if bh method Is used in u u
of malytic virginity, the results, while valuable, must be carefully
validat d least they be illcgitimati
Outcomes are determin dj not describ d , vubabilisticiy . Suppose
a giv ;n weapon system has a 40^ kill probability gainst . giv n bhr it,
VJhat do :.s this mean? Is it i m .isure of past reliability, meaning that
it killed 4Q/2 of bh barg< ' t .acked? Or Is It l guess it bhe future
reliability, basi d on the known p rform nee of bh' :ompon q ,s md an
estimate of the enemj d< r ' . V 3om times ihes« prob bilistic results
leave the military plann r li. a i uandary. How does : : ploy a LQ,*,
effective system?
The war gaming method a y move this dilemma (while probably
creating new ones) by making: a determination of each event, using,
most likely, the same known component caj ibiiities. In the course of
the battle, the game will undoubtedly show that bh weapon system in




but by "playing out" each
event, it may show where the kills occur and in what situations th
system Ls useless. Th:. history of bhe game will giv< bhe military
decisionmaker a better pictu] £ I j rt played ; ., .c ipon
system than an nalytic solution which states only bl ov rail pre' -




Th; ;; .!..• is "op . r .!. ' o . ..l 1
'
This advantage )f computer simulat d
.
-is games Is, quit! iturally, I riv d " .... Its similiari „ : ictual
or manual war games. In oth r ord3, Lt is a inalytic or "j p " ..
which retains the feature of actual at-s practice, bhe "try it -
approach, m approach of pro^ ... milit ry • orth, This, of course, is t
rationale behind classioal war garnii i id Is ... ntioned h re .5 1 cur
advantage only in the octent that bhe current count \ rt r tains this
charact sristic .
Th-. r.mo .'.i '0 in i is oev .:-., ..' corr latioij ..^q.. en it
5
. This tr .it
w s mentioned earlier s u obj ctiv of ir gaming, but is listed as an
adv u ; - because it s ems bo b on c r bhe aspects of Lh gaming tech-
nique moot rel svant .nd useful in modern military ilysis. The method-
ical approach of operations • 'ch has 1 in to brc; lown . compl .:
problem nd xamine : ch 1 Ltj ' Its f boi d form. This procedure,
label r1 nuh optima atic , i 3 bo optim: ompoj at md arrive
at in optimal overall system
Thin process, while producti1 , loses some of its power wh
kno ; interactions ^ec^. ir. oh ..ij ; •o.-inu, ~nd bh r . .. ' z •' j rts
cannot be rejoined in a logical way with assurance of efficiency in bh
composition. Recall bhe sxampl< in chapl r six in which ; . helicopt
rch pi . 3 superimposed on oh d stroj r search plan with no
guarantee of .1 efficient comb: I search plan,
The war gaming m bhod will net d^-fii .0 bh< co] 1 lation b w
units Ln th s cas Such * 1 Fii L1 La auld be an input ^ bhe gam«
: I
: h ad -... b
_
of mi g ould lost if bhej could I fin d
"h '. th ' j.. will do, with i ability -~" . p bition, i . .ch
56

combination displays . ...• i : 1 \ .s In ffici - dj i pro bility
of success, Th - b st i tci : : 1 souabin tion of n ;.. roi; i nits ioaj
discovered by "trying" bheia a,., v bhou the- nature of .. inter-
action leading to the best outcome is not discern: 1 Th .x ct
interdependence between units ssekin bhe sam obj ctive ma^ i main
a mystery, but if the most r f ective method of deploying these units
can b" found, bh< mystery does Lot r m Ln a stumbling block.
Gaming analysis may be more r .lir/tic To suggest r ialism as
advantage to computer Simula l, d ; : aming may raise a guffaw from
those exposed to the techniqu - Mor oft i. than not, the prime con-
demning adjective applied to war games is "unrealistic", It is true
that the simulation method do^s not purport to accurately photograph
the real world. Since this is true of all mod sling, to co..it ire bhe
realism of various models does not seem profitable. To claim i lism
as an advantage of war gaming it will have to be contrasted with the
actual war game or fleet exercise method of obtaining information
Since all a priori military analysis is "unreal" in a strict s nse,
the question to be asked is which approach will lead to information
most true to the real conflict.
It may be argued bhat the war gaming approach will n
more realistic than an actual fleet exercise of iimiliar content.
Is this always true? It may be th t mlytic war gaming will fit the
criterion in some case. In nu ny Fls b "cc lflicts", the kill det r-
mination is made by the throw of the dice or is d :id d upon by an
umpire. The umpir* m 3 b interested in xtracting Li.' most Lt-sea





rolon g r? ng ... for 4 . Ls r >oi Ls procedui ma
„
idvantagous for bra: ; ; pur] .. , but 3 .ds suits ' ;. ,r
unreliable for critical t : ' 1 . .... " .s:s, it cy
more desirable bo model the exercis . . ; desigj bh Mont . Carlo tech-
niques in such a way so as to fl mit caj ' Lliti . .. ju-
rat eiy as bhey ./: . known. In effect, if the purposes of the fl
exercises (training and analysis) cannot bj separat d at u.i t it may
be more advantagous to resort to an analytic method which can ma]
the separation and describe the int rplay with a single purpose in
mind
.
The ,r^.;° can bv rc^la;/ :d . The analytic war game, as has be
suggested, lies somewhere between pu .. thematical studios and opera-
tional games or exercises. Its replayability is an asset not generally
enjoyed by the other two methods In the field, it would be sxtremely
enlightening to replay many of the ctual operational encounters under
the exact saiae conditions, thereby allowing for a meaningful comparsion
between two different tactical approaches. This is seldom possible,
and all too often there remains the suspicion that one system or tactic
appears sup :rior because of :.. fortunate conditions in which it performed
The ability of replaying a situation is not absent from mathematic il
studies, which have som r p '.itive capabilities. It is often possible
to change one parameter whil holding bh oth r Inputs constant, and
thus approximate a new system operating agai] ;t bh same threat. In
this respect, the definil • math ... tical method do e . _t compare un-
favorably to the war g .. i i ... bhod, Th dv n s of r am: in
this asp ct rest mainly on 1 p t it i. g me is built
I

express c1 cha ac , ci tic of ease of repl j nd this ... : r- 'L . better
vehicle to ittain th< merits of / m -ous plays .nd ma] Lts Llts
more amenable to statistical malysis.
2. Bonus advan bages .
The two advantages listed below do not pertain directly to the
analytic method itself, but rather to advent
_
-.?. from ,/j.ich the decision-
maker benefits by employing the war gaming method, regardless of bh<
ultimate results or the 1 .ok thereof. It should be noticed, howev r,
that these advantages only iccru in the cas where the decisionmaker
associates himself closely with the gam< and its build jr.
Efodcling a comply: situation iner::^ ~: ui-.'s ur-^-rst ndir.;- of ti:
basic structure of thr probl-in . This advantage of modeling, wheth r
the model be mathematical or physical, lies in the fact that the process
of construction, by itself, can often lead to the discovery of many
underlying and hitherto unknown caus a and sffects iiich act in the real
world, as the analyst assembles the war gam< tnd tries to describe
mathematically the iction taking place, he is forced to scrutinize .he
relationships between svents md participants in minute detail,
must painstakingly detail ach vent ind interaction. In doing this,
he may look at the particular sv nt in a ne nd critical manner, a
look .:hich often breeds fortuitous changes in the way of doing things.
While setting forth the logic of th< gam , th gam r may not:
illogical arrangements of forces or inconsist nt procedures which have
never been illuminated b fore , if the game cannot solve the;
inconsistencies, the experience ,....,, lead to a nee sssary reapprasial and
constructive future action. Although
-h, urue nature of th ;se discov
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ies may be valuable froia ... ducational point of view, t. u tlj <ic
gain should not be ov^rl^ei . : siciplj ;au it is not ima Lately
useful,. A methodology which do* s : mo .haj jxpose errors can bo
considered as analytically advantagous.
Analytic war rwhir may | rovide a needed link between tl»e civilian
analyst and the operational coiomander * ear gaming is a method of tac-
tical and strategic evaluation quite natural to the military officer.
In time of peace, or, to be more sophisticated, in time of minimum
military involvement, the operational comma d -r employs various tech-
niques to maintain and improve his fighting units. ". 11 these tech-
niques have different labels, J- th -j may be generally consid .red as
war games in the traditional sense. He has also developed many proced-
ures for planning future action from artificial models, such as; drawing
lines on maps, using maneuvering boards, maintaining tactical trainers,
canned problems, an'' other Simulation devices.
Concurrently with the renewed effort in the manual war gaming
area, there has been an increasing use ^T mathematical techniques for
attacking military problems and clarifying military complexities.
Since World War II, one application of operations research methods to
military problems has grown continuously, and has become an essential
part of all military planning.
The advantage of computer simulated war games to be extolled here
is that it may provide the link between these two approaches to milit 3
Fleet exercises, bivouacs, gam s, I r lining cruises, and numerous




analysis; one of which is natural to the military officer and in which
hi can comfortably improve his operational com] banc , and the other
approach taken primarily by civilian ai ilysts, researchers, and scon-
owists, who are trying to pass on to bh< military the benefits of their
fortes. Rather than have these two avenues to better strategy and
tactics at odds with each other, or at best unaligned, the modern anal-
ytic war game may provide the best setting in which to bring together
these two sciences to the increased good of ohe entire national defense
effort,
3» Disadvantar.es .
Before discussing the disadvantag *s of using the computer war gam-
ing technique to solve military problems, it may be informative to
decide what is meant by a disadvantage or drawback to a methodology.
In this paper, a disadvantage will be taken bo be an identification of
a problem encountered while using this method, which might not arise if
another approach to the problem '.ere used. If the gamin method cannot
solve a given problem, this will not be considered a disadvantage, but
rather a limitation. If the game is of such a nature so as to appear
to solve a problem when it really does not, bhis is a disadvantage.
This chapter will not be explicitly concerned with limitations of the
method since many of Lhese have been alluded to previously. Rather,
an attempt will be made to point out some of the reasons for the con-
sternation that often arises \/hen the technique is employed to aid the
military decisionmaker.
The average game is not easy to follow . It has been suggested in
chapter four that the user should read, check, and throughly understand
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the internal logic of the r .... : : /hat . s can be satisfi d
consistency of ih< 'esul s This Ls sasier bo . t 1 ... ... accomj Lish s
If the user has been personally in olved ith ... :onstruction of the
model, he laay be reasonably content. If not, by far the most common sit-
uation, he may find it difficult, time consuming, or even impossible uc
fully understand all the internal mechanisms by which the game proceeds.
In this state of affairs, how is he to make good use of the game's
revelations? He probably cannot.
Before going further, it is imp rative that the gravity of the
need for logical validity, to the satisfaction of the decisionmaker,
be established. The problem of impressing upon the executive the use-
fulness of an operations research study is not a new one. Tne decision-
maker has many justifiable misgivings about mathematical solutions which
are, of necessity, abstractions from the actual setting. In many cases,
however, when the study is :o,.. I . d, the solution is "obvious", or
easily checked and accepted.
Consider two famous operations research studies of World War II
vintage: one involving a new procedure for washing mess kits, and the
other pointing to a change in ... • lepth setting of a depth charge(l7) t
In each case, the solution could be checked at little risk.
As the operations researc] er tackles problems on a higher tactical
or strategic scale, he must give the decisionmaker more and more assurance
before a change will be made.. In war gaming, where tl method is most
promising when dealing .arge and complex military arra:. ... :..s,
suggested changes a; e not painless be ;ry, and .. .e decisis. . r must
act with conviction. A ',;ar gam. Ln ' Ls >.: . may Imply ihat an ntire
6:;:

weapon system Ls not wort] its cc
,
hat a 10J lefens iys1 ;in
deployment needs to be re i.r ... d
As the sol mi itj of bhe decisions increases and operational ch ;ks
become more difficult, tl - a ed for validation of results becomes manda-
tory, If this cannot be done, bhe technique may not be a satisfactory
approach Lo military problems. If the builder works in conditions -emote
from daily co .sultation \ ith military opinion, ho may fail to construct
his internal logic in conformance with the essence of the real world
situation, or with bhe current operational judgment.
One way to beat this drawback is to fully document bhe game so that
the user can brace the logic easier. Unfortunately - , experience to da^e
indicates bhat this may double the time and effort n?ed ;d Lo build -he
game, or require excessive toil after the game has been completed and
presented to the user.
One misguided assumption can ef\,.h. bhe entire outcome ^.r'aajro-
portionately , The war gaming method has been cited as advanta ous in
that it can be used to seek bhe solution to an entire series of com-
plicated interactions, rather than obtain the result from a summation
of factored-out subproblems, With this quality goes an obvious draw-
back. When going for all or nothing in a solution, one mistaken as-
sumption can result in nothing, and more sffort is wast d than if the
mistake were made in a small subr abl m
The delicacy needed in choosing assumptions was stressed in
chapter two and it may no b e c Lea i tec ptab imption
a iyw] s] ' ;. ' ua .. :-./ a ' progr uu I ' : re-
rdless of : cell of • C i ieJ ay be, in
(

the end, so many objections, reaso r ot , ..... Lon
mad in I ae, bh : he pre 1 i J t . Left . .. . mo e c . rvative
and well test d method.
Many of bh obj ctions arise because, it will be r ', bl
war game is distinctive in bhal L1 mpts to put do m all bhe relevant
happenings and their effects, ve hose caus d bji n bu il a :'' human
forces* In doing so, bhe gamer has poi J is product to an aidless
stream of criticism, since very few people .111 agree on a giv n interp-
reticn of human behavior.
The above disadvantage can be reduced somewhat in scops if the
builder consults often with bhe user, and others knowledgeable in bh
field, during the construction of the game
The analytic r.amin.-', ui-.rbhod conflicts -JJth the i! .iud;^,. .. :. of c.l; .^-ts"
Cjoncejyt, As slat d sarlier, the war g ime is a blend, bringing bog bher
contributions from bhe civilian analyst and the field commander. This
characteristic, mentioned before as a virtue, may turn out to be a vice
if the blending never takes place. The military commander, no mu t
make the final decision, has found that he has to rely hi avily on per-
sonal judgment and sxperiencej whereas bhe ci ilian inalyst may sometimes
feel that all problems, military or otherwise, can be solv d. by ,he ap-
plication of the scientific method, Lf bhe proper bechnj " developed.
The war game provides "experience" in u irtifical i n and often
provides it where it is not attainab] in any other way, Is this experi-
ence comparable to ad 1 military ex] ] i nee? Hovj can it best be us d'
Answers to questions of this nature help to decide the proper u^e of
game method, and whe • .
., Loym nb will ultimat ly aid or hinder

the decisionmaker.
It is conceivable that w r gaming ma^ : i I to £ Ltute for
actual exercises and become a rehicl' for bl ; kii ~ n military
decisions by nonmilitary personm . Th: suld apj sar to be an un-
fortunate use of a potentially ' neficial bechi Lque. Hie gaming
method, ./hen used in proper perspective, should ,; ;omplementary to
actual military experience and suppl ment the "judgment of experts",
rather than replace it.
The product ma;/ never "sell" . This last objection is aimed pri-
marily at the practice of building "all purpose" or g ;neral war ame
models, It has been emphasized throughout this thesis that the objec-
tive of the game must be firmly establi;:!: ed in c<^ ir ^o make logical
assumption:, and to make best use of hue results, It may be possible
to modify a. game, built for one purpose, to make i t useful for another
purpose, but this amounts to a new wa game using iome of the old model-
ing techniques.
Most operations research studies i e constructed iround the problem
to be solved and this is ;n ally true of studies utilizing bhe siuiula-
tion device,, However, there seems to be an urge on bhe part of some
compulsive model builders to put togetl ;r games md bhen seek a use for
them. This does not seem to be the most effective ma of applying
the technique to military lituatio
Rather than describing reality in mathematical form, the pursuers
of this a< proach are trying to mak i reality fit a preconceived mc4 1
with minimum change in the model. This tactic can not only - I bo
strained assumptions, ut could also I '' set f olvin ] *ob-
lems which the decisionmaker lo not h \i , hile negl I Lng the on

that he ' s gra] 1 ; i Lth
Co.'-. -sations with military plans : , 1 j 'oblemi
may be solv d ' y he us< of a ami] ,,, Lndica I 3 pref
develop thei own models rat ran dapl . ....')
tence. If this a universial f 1: ;, then garni 3 constructed for
usage and not related to a specific military problem maj be consi^
to the shelf The talents con:.;... ' in such efforts ma^ yj Id
potential benefits to the decisionraa] r*.
The military services, if they are to reap the benefits of tl
new and powerful analytic technique, must invade the pri\ y of bi
civilian model builders and suggest objectives, while . 1 ... time
providing accurate data with which the researcher can cha his




sfh; . !" ICE ' ' I El ..'
'
1. idams, ! .", J ! Ln
,
J L " imulation of ' 1/] .ti .
with the Air Battle Model," JORSa , 7ol. 8, fro. 5> Octo I960
2, Andlinger, G. R. "Business Games-Play On ," iiaiv.^rd
Buainesa Rjvi:n: t March-April 195&«
3c Antosiewicz, H, A, "Analytic Study of .rar Games," llaval
Research Logistics '.juartorly , 7oI 2, No, 3, Sej t uab sr 1955.
A, Bellman, R,, ot al. "On the Construction of a Multi-Stage,
Multi-Person Game," JuD7/. , ifol, 5, No. 4, August 1957.
5. Biser, E, and. Meyerson, M, "The Application of Design of
Experiments and Modelin i^o Complex Weapons Systems," J^u3.. >
7ol. 5, No, 2, April 1957 -
6, Bowker, A, H, and Lieberman, G. J ""^.rirr.c-r:.:!,-' Ctaiistics .
Prentice-Hall, 1959*
7* Clark, C. S, "Importance Sampling in Mont larlo Analysis,"
Jin"
A
, 7ol 9, No. 5, October 19-1.
8. Conway, R. Ti >, et al» "Some Problems of Digital >ys ems
Simulation," i-ianaf,?iur.t rcier.e
. 7c1 . 6, No, 1, October 1959<
9* Cushen, W, E, "War Games and Operatio s .'' search," Phil-
osophy of Science
. Vol, 22, No, 4, October 1955
«
10. Caller, B A. The Lanftua,'-;e of Jo; 3rs McGraw-Hill, 1962
11. Harling, J, "Simulation Techniques in Operations
A Review,"" JORSA, Vol. 6, No. 3, June 1953




13- Livermore, ,; K. Tuv „... ! .. : .":-i - ;;;1>^ . Clarke, 1S98,




15, McHugh, F. J.. "Fundamentals of War Gaming," The" Unit. r1
Shales ka-ral ar Jolle.'.o . 2nd, i , ' r 1961,
16. Mood, A. M. "War Gamin, nique of Analj is,"
The RAND Corp .. P-899, September 1954.
17 • Morse, P. M, and Kimball, G« ;, ^thods of Operations
Research





,' The RAND CorT
19. iuad , ' ' (ed.), "Analysis fo .. - 3
The RAND Corp .. R-3S7-PR, liarch IS '
20, Rich, R. F, "Simulation as an Aid in 1-iodel Building, 11
Jo iA j 7ol. 3, No, 1, February I?;;
21 Resume' of War Games Typos and Terms,. GPL.'.'/ Instruction
03000 7, 12 February I960. (Confidential).
22. Sayre, F, i-iap ^j.:..u -vs and Tactical Tl- : ;.-
,,
mj ;rvice
School Pr - 1910.
23. Stra , '' J, "The Nature of Op c - rch," Jo. J3n :
7ol. S, To. 5, June i960.





25., The International Dictionary of Applied i lathviatic 3 v\ .
Nostrand, 19
26. Thomas, h J and Deemer, ' . L "The Role cf Dp atioi 1
Garni] f in Operations I 3 arch," Jo ".".* , /ol, 5, No. 1, Febru .
1957,
27. Wall 3, '' A and Roberts, H, 7 : ij is tics; .1 New a\ : ~ -
The Free I s, 1956
28. W ton operations mcil. Fi y- : '
[
a "->../:."
Symposium. Pro:r:odiij-r,s . J, L. Overholt ( d November 196l
29. Watson, P. 3. and Abernathy, T. R. ""..'or Gaming ,
Digital Computer-A Di cusoion and an Example," Unpublished
Master's thesis, Unit ' States Naval .l : iduat >ol, 1 1.
30. Wei] , M« G. "War Game h :hodology, ': . T..J.-.P Jo.',. 9
RM-2413, July 1959
>
31. — "An Introduction to War Gam The PTihD Corp, „
P-I773> August 1959
32. Young, J. P, "A Survey of Historical Develops in
War Games," Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins U;
ff Pap 98, August 1959,
33. Zimmerman, P.. E '.. hont 3arlc iiodol for ...











3 2768 00416502 7
U 276408
SirtfimfflHSg
.
I.
.
"
